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Letters of Comfort Revisited 
H.S.B.C. v. Jurong 
 
A. Introduction 
 
Since the English Court of Appeal’s decision in Kleinwort Benson Ltd v. Malaysia Mining Corp. Bhd,1 it would be 
understandable if the business community placed little or no reliance on letters of comfort save in the exceptional 
case where the terms evince an undeniably clear intention to create binding obligations. It might therefore seem 
somewhat surprising that an experienced and sophisticated institution should commence proceedings in the High 
Court of Singapore on the premise of a letter of awareness in Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Ltd v. 
Jurong Engineering Ltd.2 This could plausibly be explained as the bank’s last-ditch attempt to salvage an ill-fated 
transaction. Yet perhaps underlying this facile explanation there also exists a tangible and sanguine expectation that 
some legal consequences should attach to assurances given by a parent company in support of its subsidiary’s 
obligations. And such expectation did not seem to have been quelled by the weight of authorities to the contrary.3 
The reasoning and result in this case reiterate the pivotal role played by the concept of contractual intent in the 
protection of parties’ expectations and provides us with a fresh opportunity to consider how such intent is to be 
ascertained. 
 
 
1. [1989] 1 W.L.R. 379. 
2. [2000] 2 S.L.R. 54. 
3. See, e.g. Kleinwort Benson [1989] 1 W.L.R. 379 (Eng.); Commonwealth Bank of Australia v. TLI Management Pty Ltd 
[1990] V.R. 510 (Aus.); Toronto-Dominion Bank v. Leigh Instruments Ltd (Trustee of) (1998) 81 A.C.W.S. (3d) 117 (Can.); 
and Bank of New Zealand v. Ginivan [1991] 1 N.Z.L.R. 178 (N.Z.). 
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B. The decision 
 
The first defendants, Jurong Engineering Ltd (“Jurong”), were a blue-chip public company. Sometime in 
1992, the plaintiffs, Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corp. Ltd (“HSBC”), granted credit facilities to Huge 
Corporation Pte Ltd (“Huge”), a 50%-owned associate of Jurong, and the said facilities were supported by a letter 
of awareness4 issued by Jurong. During the negotiations, Jurong firmly declined to issue any corporate guarantee as 
security for the facilities. Between 1992 and 1994, the facilities were twice increased from $4 million to $6 million 
and $26 million respectively; however, only $16 million was eventually utilized by Huge. On each occasion of 
extension, a fresh letter of awareness incorporating amendments requested by Jurong was issued to support the 
increased facility. Around June 1994, Jurong also acquired an additional 1% stake in Huge, thereby converting it 
into a subsidiary. 
 
From early 1995, Huge’s financials began to deteriorate rapidly. Without informing HSBC, Jurong disposed of 1% 
of their shareholding in Huge in November 1996. Upon discovering the disposition through press articles, HSBC 
reduced the facilities to $8.25 million. Huge eventually failed to make any repayment and was subsequently wound 
up on the petition of another judgment creditor. HSBC then commenced actions against Jurong, inter alia, for 
breach of the letter of awareness. 
 
At the time of the trial, the subject-matter of dispute was the third letter of awareness issued by Jurong. The critical 
terms are as follows:5 
 
We also confirm that, so long as any amount is outstanding to you under such banking facilities: 
1. We will continue to maintain our [50%] 51% ownership of the borrower and hereby undertake to advise 
you forthwith in the event of any decision being taken to dispose of the whole or part of our shareholding in the 
borrower. 
2. We will cause the borrower to be operated and maintained in such a way as to be in a financial position to 
meet all its obligations from time to time to you. If the borrower is unable for any reason to meet its obligations, we 
will endeavour to either: 
(a) make funds available to the borrower sufficient to meet its obligations, or 
(b) have funds made available to the borrower by others in amounts sufficient to enable the borrower to meet its 
obligations. 
3. We will not take any action which will result in the borrower being unable to carry on its business orotherwise 
being unable to meet all its obligations from time to time to you and hereby undertake to advise you forthwith of 
any circumstances which may affect the continuing operation of the borrower. 
 
The High Court dismissed HSBC’s claims on the ground that the evidence of the parties’ conduct in the negotiation 
of the letter of awareness coupled with a proper construction of the text of the letter did not, as a whole, disclose 
any intention to create legal relations. 
 
4. In the judgment, no distinction was drawn between the terms “letter of awareness” and “letter of comfort”, both of which 
were used interchangeably in reference to a generic group of documents the effect of which generally falls short of 
guarantees: see [2000] 2 S.L.R. 54, 70. Whilst it is arguable that the words “awareness” and “comfort” can connote different 
degrees of commitment on the part of the issuer, nonetheless it seems more correct not to attach any material weight to the 
terms, as the legal effect of the letter is ultimately a question of construction of the content thereof, as is consistent with the 
approach in Kleinwort Benson [1989] 1 W.L.R. 379, 391. See also the text accompanying infra, fns 6–8. 
5. [2000] 2 S.L.R. 54, 60–61. 
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C. The presumption in Edwards v. Skyways 
 
In considering the effect of the letter of awareness, Tay Yong Kwang, J.C., began from the broad premise that the 
term “letter of awareness” was not a term of art the mere use of which would dictate the precise liabilities assumed 
by its issuer and that “in each case, one must look beyond the name of the document and see exactly what was 
intended by the parties”.6 In ascertaining such intention, the learned judge applied the principle in Edwards v. 
Skyways Ltd,7 with the result that the letter of awareness, having been created in a commercial setting, is presumed 
to give rise to legally binding obligations. The onus of rebutting the presumption was borne by Jurong. However, 
Tay, J.C., went on to explain8 that 
 
the operation of the presumption does not detract the court from its fundamental task, which is to ascertain 
the true bargain between the parties, to seek the substance and reality of the transaction and to ascertain 
what common intentions should be ascribed to the parties. In carrying out this task of construction, the 
court is to have regard to the surrounding circumstances as well as the specific text of the Letter of 
Awareness. Since the effect to be attributed to each Letter of Awareness is essentially a matter of 
construction, each case turns on its own facts. Past cases concerning Letters of Awareness are not 
precedents in the strict sense of the word and only provide useful guidelines for the court. 
 
It will be recalled that in Kleinwort Benson,9 Ralph Gibson, L.J., held that the application of the presumption in 
Edwards v. Skyways was restricted to those occasions where the language of a term of the letter of comfort 
disclosed a promissory obligation. Hence, in Kleinwort Benson, the presumption did not apply, as the defendants’ 
statement that it was its policy to ensure that its subsidiary was at all times in the position to meet its liabilities 
disclosed no such promissory obligation but was a mere representation of fact which was correct at the time it was 
made.10 The central idea of this approach rests on the distinct dichotomy between the parties’ intention as regards 
the existence of the agreement as opposed to the content thereof. The parties’ intention in respect of the legal effect 
of the latter would, following the approach in Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd v. Mardon,11 have to be affirmatively proven 
by the plaintiffs.12 This approach appears to have found favour both with commentators13 as well as judges.14 One 
possible justification lies in that “it would be commercially unrealistic, as well as contrary to principle, to adopt any 
rule which assumed that letters of comfort were generally effective in creating a liability on the issuer…. To 
assume that the issue of a letter of comfort creates a binding obligation to recompense a financier for any losses 
incurred in the transaction is to create a contract of 
 
6. [2000] 2 S.L.R. 54, 71. See also supra, fn. 4. 
7. [1964] 1 W.L.R. 349. 
8. [2000] 2 S.L.R. 54, 71 (emphasis added). 
9. [1989] 1 W.L.R. 379, 390. 
10. Ibid., 390–391. 
11. [1976] Q.B. 801. 
12. Kleinwort Benson [1989] 1 W.L.R. 379, 390. 
13. See, e.g., A.de Moore, “Intention in the Law of Contract: Elusive or Illusory?” (1990) 106 L.Q.R. 633, 636; A.Forte, 
“Letters of Comfort and Letters of Cold Comfort” (1990) 21 JMLC 99, 105; and J.F.Burrows, J.Finn & S.M.D.Todd, 
Cheshire & Fifoot’s Law of Contract in New Zealand, 8th N.Z. edn (Butterworths, 1997), 152. 
14. See, e.g., Commonwealth Bank of Australia v. TLI Management Pty Ltd, [1990] V.R. 510, 517. 
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guarantee which the parties have refused to make for themselves”.15 With respect, however, such argument is not 
entirely persuasive. A refusal to issue a corporate guarantee is sometimes explicable on grounds other than an 
unwillingness to incur legal obligations, such as the avoidance of additional contingent liabilities which may 
contravene other contractual commitments, or simply to preserve certain tax or foreign exchange advantages.16 
Furthermore, the obligations under a letter of comfort can be crafted in terms significantly more restricted than 
those under a guarantee,17 in which case it is difficult to see why the presumption of contractual intent should be 
inappropriate. Even if the prior refusal to issue a guarantee does in fact negate any undertaking to provide funding, 
it does not follow that it would negate all other obligations, such as an undertaking to maintain the issuer’s 
shareholding in the borrower. Finally, it must be borne in mind that the presumption in Edwards v. Skyways is but a 
presumption rebuttable on the totality of the available evidence, and the parties’ prior refusal to create a guarantee 
is but one fact (albeit a significant one) which contextualizes the document. In HSBC v. Jurong, Tay, J.C., applied 
the presumption in Edwards v. Skyways notwithstanding the finding that the terms of the letter were not “in the 
form of an express contractual promise”.18 It will thus appear that, to this extent, Tay, J.C., has departed from Ralph 
Gibson, L.J.’s approach in Kleinwort Benson. The upshot of this is that the presumption in Edwards v. Skyways 
applies to place the burden on the defendants to rebut the presumption of contractual intent, but it is the totality of 
the evidence before the court which must be considered in determining whether the burden has been discharged.19 
The language used by the parties is one (and certainly a very significant one) of the key indicia of the parties’ 
intention. The distinction drawn by Ralph Gibson, L.J., in connection with the application of the presumption in 
Edwards v. Skyways appears plausible when applied in the specific context of cases such as Esso Petroleum v. 
Mardon,20 where the inquiry is focused on whether a statement is of a promissory nature in the context of a larger 
contractual transaction the existence of which is not in doubt. But the distinction becomes unreal and unhelpful 
when (as is common in cases involving letters of comfort) both the intention to contract and the promissory nature 
of the statement are in doubt.21 Consider the scenario where a contract comprises essentially one principal 
obligation; it must then be obvious that the two questions, first, whether the parties intended that obligation to be 
promissory and, secondly, whether they intend a binding obligation to exist, are one and the same question. More 
precisely, the former is a more specific inquiry made with a view to establish the latter. A legally binding contract 
must by definition entail legally enforceable obligations; 
 
 
15. See Burrows, Finn & Todd, supra, fn. 13, at 153. 
16. See Banque of Brussels Lambert SA v. Australian National Industries Ltd [1989] 2 N.S.W.L.R. 502, 
520, and the literature cited therein. 
17. See the first instance decision of Hirst, J., in Kleinwort Benson [1988] 1 W.L.R. 799, 809–810. 
18. [2000] 2 S.L.R. 54, 74. It should, however, be noted that Kleinwort Benson was not referred to in Tay, J.C.’s 
judgment and it is therefore possible that the learned judge may not have considered the distinction drawn by 
Ralph Gibson, L.J., as regards the applicability of the presumption in Edwards v. Skyways . 
19. See text accompanying supra, fn. 8. 
20. Supra, fn. 11. 
21. See the forceful criticism by I.Brown, “The Letter of Comfort: Placebo or Promise?” [1990] J.B.L. 281,288. 
See also D.Clarke, “Cold Comfort Letter-Kleinwort Benson Ltd v. Malaysia Mining Corp Bhd ” (1990) 69 
Can. Bar Rev. 753, 756; and D.W.Greig & J.L.R.Davies, The Law of Contract, 5th Cumulative Supp.(Law 
Book Co., 1993), 58. 
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the existence of a contract therefore cannot be determined in the abstract in an expanse entirely devoid of its 
content. Does the nature of the inquiry alter when the paradigm changes to that of a contract with numerous 
obligations? Surely not. However numerous the obligations in a contract, every issue arising for adjudication 
presents the court with the same challenge—that of determining if a particular obligation is binding. It must 
follow, then, that a presumption as to parties’ contractual intention is a presumption as to both the existence of a 
binding obligation as well as its content, and not merely the former. Admittedly, on the facts of Edwards v. 
Skyways, it is arguable that the description of the obligation (namely, the payment of a certain sum) does import a 
greater degree of certainty, such that it bears a closer form to that of a promise. Nonetheless, while certainty is 
undoubtedly a material consideration, the task at hand remains that of discerning the parties’ intention. 
It is respectfully submitted that Tay Yong Kwang, J.C.’s approach in HSBC v. Jurong is to be preferred to that of 
Ralph Gibson, L.J., in Kleinwort Benson; namely, that prima facie, there is a presumption that an arrangement 
created in a commercial context is intended to create legal obligations, with the result that the onus falls on the 
party disclaiming responsibility thereunder to adduce evidence to the contrary. Apart from the palpable result of 
avoiding the unintended emasculation of the presumption in Edwards v. Skyways,22 this approach also redirects the 
focus of the inquiry on all relevant evidence before the court, thereby steering clear of the danger of determining 
commercial disputes with a “finely tuned linguistic fork”23 and the attendant risks of obliquity in judgment. 
 
D. Rebutting the presumption 
 
In Tay, J.C.’s judgment, two considerations featured prominently in the learned judge’s finding that the 
presumption to create legal relations had been rebutted. First of all, the court found that the plaintiffs did not in fact 
place any significant reliance on the letter of awareness in their decisions to extend credit facilities to Huge.24 
Several considerations pointed to this lack of reliance: the plaintiffs’ apparent indifference25 to the wording of the 
letter during the negotiations and their persistent requests for the issuance of a corporate guarantee by the first 
defendants even after the letter of awareness had been furnished;26 the first defendants’ refusal from the outset to 
issue a corporate guarantee;27 and perhaps more importantly, the plaintiffs, cognizant of its relatively weak 
bargaining position in a highly competitive market, had accepted the greater risks associated with Huge and the 
 
 
22. See Brown [1990] J.B.L. 281, 288. Interestingly, the presumption in Edwards v. Skyways continues to find its place in 
most classic English texts on contract law without the limitation crafted by Ralph Gibson, L.J; see, e.g., Chitty on 
Contracts, vol. 1, 28th edn (Sweet & Maxwell, 1999), 155; and G.Treitel, The Law of Contract, 10th edn (Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1999), 157. 
23. Per Rogers, C.J., in Banque Brussels Lambert SA v. Australian National Industries [1989] 2 N.S.W.L.R. 502, 524. 
24. [2000] 2 S.L.R. 54, 72. 
25. The plaintiffs had accepted the amendments proposed by the first defendants (for instance, to substitute the words“shall 
endeavour” in cl. 2 of the second letter of awareness for the words “will, on demand, immediately”, thereby completely 
eroding the promissory nature of the undertaking) with virtually no negotiation. Also, the plaintiffs had on each occasion of 
extension of the facilities agreed to such extension before the actual issuance of the fresh letter of awareness: see [2000] 
S.L.R. 54, 72–73. 
26. Though it should be pointed out that a subsequent request for a more substantive security is by no means inconsistent with 
the existence of a binding and enforceable but lesser security. 27. See [2000] 2 S.L.R. 54, 74. See also the text 
accompanying supra, fns 15–18. 
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lack of security as they had valued the transaction primarily as a means of establishing business relations with the 
first defendants.28 The fact of reliance by a party to a transaction has long been accepted as an important means of 
establishing contractual intent.29 
 
On the facts of the present case, the inquiry was ostensibly directed at the fact of actual (or subjective) reliance 
(which was found wanting) but it is submitted that, in line with the objective nature of the inquiry on parties’ 
contractual intent, the search for such reliance must also (and necessarily) involve an objective assessment. In other 
words, it is not sufficient to show that actual reliance was placed on the letter, but also that such reliance was 
reasonable in all the circumstances. This is borne out (though admittedly subtly) by the learned judge’s conclusion, 
taking into account the circumstances surrounding the making of the letter of awareness as well as the equivocal 
nature of its terms, that no “experienced and prudent bankers would or should rely wholeheartedly on such a 
document as security”.30 
 
The second consideration which appeared to be instrumental in rebutting the presumption of contractual intent was 
the effect ascribed to the terms of the letter of awareness. In construing the letter, Tay, J.C., preferred to look at the 
“general tone of the Letter of Awareness, bearing in mind the surrounding circumstances of the case”,31 instead of 
engaging in a “minute and protracted examination of every single word or term used in the document”.32 The 
learned judge found that the letter of awareness was “drafted in the language of deliberate equivocation in keeping 
with a ‘gentleman’s agreement’ and thus amounted to no more than a confirmation by the issuer that he will abide 
by his moral obligations”.33 However, the learned judge appeared to have adopted a somewhat restrictive 
interpretation of the terms in coming to this conclusion. In particular, cl. 1 of the letter was found to be a mere 
confirmation of the first defendants’ shareholding in Huge and did not prohibit the disposition thereof.34 Yet it is 
patently clear that the words “We will continue to maintain our 51% ownership of the borrower” could very well, 
on its natural and ordinary meaning, amount to an outright undertaking. The learned judge also did not think that cl. 
3 was intended to create any binding obligation, since “it was hardly conceivable that the first defendants were 
binding themselves to be legally obliged to promptly inform the plaintiffs of every commercial decision regarding 
Huge which they might be considering in the privacy of their Boardroom or to divulge sensitive information 
regarding Huge to the plaintiffs”. While it is certainly true that no corporation would readily commit to divulging 
sensitive information to any third party, that cannot in itself be conclusive on the legal effect of the clause. The 
corporation’s reticence must surely be weighed against the perfectly rational request of the lender who, when asked 
to assume more risks than he was happy to bear, would at the very least seek to minimize his exposure by securing 
prompt access to material information on the borrower so as to be able to react nimbly to any adverse development. 
 
 
 
28. [2000] 2 S.L.R. 54, 71, 77. 
29. See Kingswood Estate Co. v. Anderson [1963] 2 Q.B. 169; South West Water Authority v. Palmer (1982) 263 E.G. 438. 
30. [2000] 2 S.L.R. 54, 76 (emphasis added). 
31. [2000] 2 S.L.R. 54, 76. 
32. Ibid. 33. Ibid. 
34. Ibid. 
  
  
CASE AND COMMENT        175 
 
Be that as it may, this seemingly restrictive approach taken in respect of the construction of the letter can be 
understood as against two other more important findings. First, the learned judge found that cl. 2, which would in 
effect afford the plaintiffs the protection akin to that of a guarantee if held enforceable, was not intended to be 
binding as the obligation therein was qualified by the words “will endeavour”. Secondly, as explained above, the 
plaintiffs had not, at the material points in time, conducted themselves in a manner consistent with the belief that 
the letter of awareness had legal effects. To that extent, then, it must be correct that, while the construction of the 
terms of a letter of comfort remains an important step in ascertaining the parties’ intention, it must (and particularly 
where the terms are nebulous) nonetheless take on a subsidiary role where the surrounding circumstances afford 
more definitive evidence of the parties’ intention. 
 
E. Conclusion 
 
The result in HSBC v. Jurong presents no surprise to the business community and legal practitioners alike and is 
largely in line with the positions in other common law jurisdictions.35 However, such results effectively reduced a 
commercial document (which is part and parcel of a larger binding transaction) to nought or, in the words of 
Rogers, C.J., “a scrap of paper”.36 Why would a sophisticated commercial entity such as HSBC insist on an 
agreement which is in effect a nullity? Is it right to place the issuer in as good a position as if there had been an 
express disclaimer of liability when clearly there was none and in all likelihood such express disclaimer would not 
have been accepted by the lender? Admittedly, on the facts of HSBC v. Jurong, it can be said that no great injustice 
has been done since HSBC is a seasoned banker well acquainted with the vicissitudes of commerce and has no lack 
of access to legal advice. It is also clear that commercial parties can and do enter into agreements relying solely on 
each other’s honour and good faith with no intention of enforcing the obligations through legal means.37 As one 
writer has explained, “the honourable word of a person of high reputation is sufficient and has value in the 
commercial world”.38  However, these considerations notwithstanding, given that the parties (as well as the court) 
usually have no difficulty acknowledging that the obligations in the letter of comfort are at the very least moral in 
nature, hence connoting a standard of conduct that is becoming or even expected of the issuer, it would surely not 
be too extravagant to suggest that our law should be slow and guarded in striking down a commercial document as 
nugatory. 
 
This need to deliberate with circumspection is further heightened by the fact that our law does not at present render 
a parent company liable for the deeds of its subsidiary save in the exceptional case where the subsidiary has been 
used for purposes of fraud, illegality, or as a “sham” or “facade”.39 Whilst creditors do in fact place significant 
reliance40 on 
 
 
 
35. See supra, fn. 3. 
36. [1989] 2 N.S.W.L.R. 502, 523. 
37. See Rose and Frank Co. v. Crompton & Bros Ltd [1923] 2 K.B. 261, 288. 
38. See N.C. Seddon & M.P. Ellinghaus, Cheshire & Fifoot’s Law of Contract, 7th Australian edn (Butterworths, 1997), 193. 
39. A stance frequently reiterated in case law. See, e.g., The Adres Bonaficio [1993] 3 S.L.R. 521, 531. 
40. Such reliance should be distinguished from the narrower concept of reliance discussed supra, Part D, which focuses on the 
bank’s reliance on the letter of comfort as a security. 
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the reputation, credit-worthiness and management expertise of the parent company in evaluating the credit risks of 
its subsidiary, the fact remains that they will have no recourse to the assets of the parent when the subsidiary fails. 
And that is so even where the parties expressly acknowledge the parentage of the debtor as an important 
consideration in the consumnation of the transaction (as is often the object of comfort letters). Seen in this light, the 
problems relating to the enforceability of comfort letters in fact raise (albeit only obliquely) the broader issue of 
whether there exists, under the current corporate law regime, adequate protection to creditors (or more particularly, 
creditors dealing with corporate groups). Given that businesses are increasingly conducted though collective groups 
of legal entities, and given the economic reality of a parent’s substantial influence and control over the affairs of its 
subsidiaries, it may perhaps be timely to consider if there is not a case for expanding the boundaries of the parent’s 
liability where it has, by its conduct (the issuance of comfort letters being one instance of such conduct), 
engendered legitimate expectations (on the part of the creditor) that it would in some measure be responsible for the 
affairs of its subsidiaries.41 
 
Returning to the present case, it is submitted that by endorsing the application of the presumption in Edwards v. 
Skyways without the restriction imposed by Ralph Gibson, L.J., Tay, J.C., has in some measure reinstated the 
proper balance needed in the interpretation of letters of comfort. The presumption in effect affirms the need to 
protect the third party’s expectation that agreements made in commercial contexts should as a matter of course be 
taken seriously; and, in the case of letters of comfort, the legitimacy of such expectation may be augmented by the 
fact of the parent company’s interest and involvement in the principal transaction. In deciding whether the 
presumption has been displaced, it will be instructive to bear in mind the wise counsel of Megaw, J., in Edwards v. 
Skyways that “the onus is a heavy one”42 and hence any excessive zeal in striking a clause out for uncertainty 
should be curbed. By the same token, one should also realize that the two stark options of complete enforceability 
of the letter on the one hand, and its complete nullity on the other, are by no means the only two outcomes available 
to the court. The enforceability and intention underlying each purported obligation should be examined and 
determined as against the wider context of all other available evidence.  
 
 
 
Pey-Woan Lee 
Assistant Professor of Law, Singapore Management University.  
 
I am grateful to Professor Andrew Phang and Associate Professor Low Kee Yang for their guidance and 
encouragement. All errors remain mine alone. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
41. Prentice has argued that the proper redress for creditors in such instances calls for reform of therelevant company law 
principle: see D. Prentice, “Letters of Comfort” (1989) 105 L.Q.R. 346, 348–349. See also Prentice, “Some Aspects of the 
Law Relating to Corporate Groups in the United Kingdom” (1999) 13 Connecticut J. of Int. Law 305, 323. 
42. [1964] 1 W.L.R. 349, 355. 
 
 
